Risk-informed design process of the IRIS reactor

Westinghouse is currently conducting the pre-application licensing of the International Reactor Innovative and Secure (IRIS). The design philosophy of the IRIS has been based on the concept of Safety-by-Design™ and within this framework the PSA is being used as an integral part of the design process. The basis for the PSA contribution to the design phase of the reactor is the close iteration between the PSA team and the design and safety analysis team. In this process the design team is not only involved in the initial phase of providing system information to the PSA team, allowing in this way the identification of the high risk scenarios, but it is also receiving feedback from the PSA team that suggests design modification aimed at reaching risk-related goals. During the first iteration of this process, the design modifications proposed by the PSA team allowed reducing the initial estimate of Core Damage Frequency (CDF) due to internal events from 2E-6/ry to 2E-8/ry. Since the IRIS design is still in a development phase, a number of assumptions have to be confirmed when the design is finalized. Among key assumptions are the success criteria for both the accident sequences analyzed and the systems involved in the mitigation strategies. The PSA team developed the initial accident sequence event trees according to the information from the preliminary analysis and feasibility studies. A recent coupling between the RELAP and GOTHIC codes made possible the actual simulation of all LOCA sequences identified in the first draft of the Event Trees. Working in close coordination, the PSA and the safety analysis teams developed a matrix case of sequences not only with the purpose of testing the assumed success criteria, but also with the perspective of identifying alternative sequences developed mainly by relaxing the extremely conservative assumptions previously made. The results of these simulations, bounded themselves with conservative assumptions on the Core Damage definition, suggested two new versions of the LOCA Event Tree with two possible configurations of the Automatic Depressurization System. The new CDF has been evaluated for both configurations and the design team has been provided with an additional and risk-related perspective that will help choosing the design alternative to be implemented.