Resilience assessment of safety-critical systems with credal networks

Hector Diego Estrada-Lugo, T. V. Santhosh, Marco de Angelis, Edoardo Patelli

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

Abstract

Nuclear accidents like Fukushima Daiichi or Three Mile Island have changed the safety paradigm to address not only the system failure but also the factors for safety. New nuclear power plant designs should consider safety parameters that maintain the operating conditions while coping with uncertain and possibly disruptive events. In other words, safety systems should increase the resilience of the nuclear power plants. In order to do so, resilience assessments must be carried out to study the system performance recovery once a disruptive event has occurred. The general process of resilience engineering comprises four states changing over time: reliability, unreliability, recovery and recovered steady-state. Probabilistic models like fault tree analysis, have been widely applied in the nuclear industry (among others) due to their flexibility to model complex engineering systems and uncertainty quantification of failure probabilities. However, such technique moderate the modeling scope when representing the interdependencies of the components in the system and variations in time over a disruption event. Moreover, additional complications in the resilience assessment process arise when considering the epistemic uncertainty due to the lack of knowledge about the events and the operating conditions. In this work, credal networks have been proposed for modeling complex interconnected systems as well as taking into account the epistemic uncertainty attached to the lack of data. The resilience assessment of the Main Heat Transport System together with key safety systems of an Advanced Thermal Reactor is carried out to evaluate the system recovery after a mishap adopting the credal network approach. The case study considers a heat removal system of a typical thermal reactor under high-pressure transients. This disruption event would activate the passive safety system to fulfill the reactor shut down process. The application of the proposed approach to producing a resilience analysis is described and results presented to demonstrate the applicability of the method.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 30th European Safety and Reliability Conference and the 15th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference
EditorsPiero Baraldi, Francesco Di Maio, Enrico Zio
PublisherResearch Publishing, Singapore
Pages1199-1206
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9789811485930
ISBN (Print)9789811485930
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020
Externally publishedYes
Event30th European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2020 and 15th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, PSAM15 2020 - Venice, Italy
Duration: 1 Nov 20205 Nov 2020

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 30th European Safety and Reliability Conference and the 15th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference

Conference

Conference30th European Safety and Reliability Conference, ESREL 2020 and 15th Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management Conference, PSAM15 2020
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityVenice
Period1/11/205/11/20

Keywords

  • Advanced Thermal Reactor
  • Bayesian networks
  • Credal networks
  • Imprecise probabilities
  • Resilience assessment

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